2. 1950, five years after World War II, can be considered as a moment where most of current evolutions started from a relatively low level, in some cases from almost zero. Cities and infrastructure were being rebuilt, there were very few cars, no tourism, many people still worked in the primary sector, the process of European political integration had not started and Europe was divided politically in two, with little social and economic exchange.

3. 2050 has been considered by some authors as a singularity point in human history, since the capacity of computers and electronic communications to manage information will be, if currents trends continue, difficult to imagine. Beyond 2050, infinite information is linked to a similar hypotheses concerning developments in energy, from the Hydrogen Era to the Solar Era. A world beyond natural constraints, with infinite information and energy is impossible to truly understand, even if likely given current trends.

4. According to most studies, in between 2005 and 2030 and up until 2050, Europe will remain peaceful and democratic, have a stable population, moderate migration, an increasing number of elderly people. This will help decrease the financial sustainability of public pension systems unless there are important economic reforms. The economy will become much less oil-dependent and less based on heavy industry, and will move towards more technology-intensive sectors and services, growing at moderate ratios in relation to Asian or North American economies—so the European share of the world economy, measured in GDP, will slowly be reduced. Overseas and passenger and freight traffic will grow rapidly. It is likely that further enlargement processes may happen, in order to increase the size of the EU market. European social and territorial cohesion, and environmental sustainability, is expected to be maintained or even improved, unless public institutions face serious financial problems. More participatory and direct democracy processes are expected. Globalisation at the world level may slow down in the short term, but there is no evidence that it will not continue to do so.

5. New technologies in energy and in ICT may produce significant productivity gains in the transport sector, depending on how they are implemented. New technologies, such as electric and highly customised vehicles and intelligent traffic management systems, may reduce congestion while reducing the need to physically expand the capacity of infrastructures, as well as increasing safety and reducing the negative effects of transport on the environment.

6. Since technological innovation follows a cumulative evolution, we can hardly imagine most of technologies beyond 2030. It is worth stating that many fundamental concepts and indicators we used may be not relevant in a few decades, such as GDP as an indicator of economic development, or “transport modes” (road, rail, aviation, maritime, IWW). New transport modes may emerge blurring the lines between private cars and public buses or trains, such as car-sharing in cities, using smaller, user-customized, cleaner and more intelligent fleet of vehicles that are automatically driven when running in some parts of the city. However, we cannot avoid remaining attached to current categories, databases and modelling frameworks in order to explain possible future evolutions.

7. Given the relatively high urbanisation of Europe, transport infrastructures in Europe can not be expanded easily in the next decade, especially in the central regions, or around major cities and metropolitan areas, at a reasonable economic and environmental cost, even if they are very congested. Because of this, achieving productivity gains in the transport sector and avoiding the increase of congestion costs above the present 1% of GDP, or reducing it, will be increasingly important.

8. In the long term, say beyond 2030, new materials and more efficient construction processes may allow for specialised transport infrastructures adapted to new type of vehicles, even in city centres, such as car parks and special urban tunnels for electric vehicles that are driven automatically when travelled across.

9. A major challenge ahead will therefore be the capacity of European governments at all levels to carry out the necessary structural changes, such as the opening of transport markets, pricing, education and training, in order to achieve potential productivity gains from technological innovation.

10. Target setting for environmental purposes has become the most determinant policy instrument for the years to come. In the framework of the climate and energy package, European institutions have set up legally binding targets for 2020. Some of principle targets are to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, to establish a 20% share for renewable energy and to improve energy efficiency by 20%. The GHG objective could be revised upwards to 30% if a satisfactory international agreement is reached (a 10% reduction in 2020 and 50% in 2050 for transport activities has been considered as a reference for TRANSvisions). In the future, it is likely that environmental targets will be increasingly used as a political instrument at all geographic levels, since they are generally viewed favourable and are relatively easy to monitor.

11. Environmental targets are also of paramount importance to induce the implementation of more advanced technologies in many sectors, and increasing productivity of the economy especially in transport sector. At this point, the difficulty of achieving the environmental targets in the transport sector are not related as much to the availability of alternative technologies as it is to the rigidities of the market.

12. Social indicators, especially those related to safety and privacy will tend to be the most important political goals. In the coming years, it is expected that social policy-aims will become as operational and effective with concrete targets as the reduction of road accidents already is.

13. Three main reference scenarios, Baseline, High Growth and Low Growth, were defined for the 2005-2030 period. The latest version of the TRANS-TOOLS transport forecast model (November 2008), was applied to explore the most likely evolution of transport demand, according to these three reference mid-term scenarios.

14. TRANS-TOOLS is an advanced 4-steps forecast model, suitable for making a mid-term strategic forecast at the European scale. The scenario specification in TRANS-TOOLS includes assessing zonal data for about 1,440 different transport zones in Europe, as well as data for about 35,000 road links and 5,000 rail links. Further cost specifications related to transport modes and specific network links and nodes are part of the specifications of the model. The TRANS-TOOLS model has been designed mainly for the analysis of infrastructure development, however, it can also be used for analysis of more general time and cost specifications covering the EU-27 and neighbouring countries: EFTA, the Balkans, Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and Turkey.

15. TRANS-TOOLS was greatly improved recently, but after using it intensively for the purpose of TRANSvisions, aspects to be further developed became evident: the geographic area for inland transport does not cover northern Africa, and air and maritime networks do not include the rest of the world. Passenger trips with origin or destination outside the EU-27 are included but not explicitly modelled, except for neighbouring countries. In the case of aviation, trips with their origin or destination outside the EU-27 are not modelled, but EU-27 trip segments are included, in non-direct flights. Freight trips with their origin or destination outside the EU-27 are included as if they had their origin or destination in a European port, except for neighbouring countries. Air freight is not included. There is also no explicit modelling of ferries, but there are included as road and rail links.

16. TRANS-TOOLS lacks a policy-oriented interface able to automatically translate its results into a number of relevant policy-indicators, which would be easier to analyse, complemented by other data and forecasts.

17. The socioeconomic Baseline scenario for 2005-2030 modelled by TRANS-TOOLS was defined as follows: In 2005, the total EU-27 population was about 491m people. In 2020 this is expected to be almost 496m and the population remains almost constant up to 2030 495m, assuming a population growth in the EU-27 as indicated in the official population TREND-forecast 2004 from EUROSTAT at the NUTS2 level. The economic development up to 2030, according to the DG-ECFIN Note 253 of June 2006, will be faster in the eastern part of Europe than in the western part. GDP per capita in the EU-15 in 2005 was about 24,000 EUR in constant 2000 prices, expected to increasing to about 37,000 EUR in 2030. In the EU-12, the GDP per capita was about 5,000 EUR in 2005. This is expected to increase to about 13,000 EUR in 2030. The ratio of GDP per capita in the EU-15 to that in the EU-12 decreases from 4.7 to 2.9.

18. In the Baseline scenario, from 2005-2030 oil prices are assumed to be, on average, at 65$ per barrel, 20% more than in 2005. The uncertainty in the evolution of oil prices is a major cause of economic instability nowadays, but in the transition towards a post-carbon society, oil prices will lose importance as an economic factor.

19. Taxes on oil in 2005 represent roughly 2% of the GDP. In the long term, as oil become less used in transport, other alternative fiscal revenue generation systems will be needed. A couple examples of these are online pricing based on the actual use of infrastructure and transport services, which is more likely to induce demand self-organisation than oil taxes. In a number of scenarios studied the reduction in public revenue from oil taxation happens very rapidly. This is as an area of opportunity in political terms, since more effective taxation systems can be implemented.

20. A High Growth scenario has been defined for the 2005-2030 period, with population growing faster than in the Baseline and reaching 527m in 2030. The economy also develops faster at a 2.6% increase in GDP per year. The TRANS-TOOLS forecast yields an annual increase of traffic of 1.5% for passenger and 2.2% for freight, well below economic growth in the TRANS-TOOLS coverage area.

21. An alternative Low Growth scenario for the 2005-2030 assumes a decrease of population down to 461m in 2030, with the economy growing at a lower 1,3% GDP increase per year. In this case, forecasted passenger traffic only grows 0.6% annually and freight 0.8%, below economic growth in the TRANS-TOOLS coverage area.

22. Four extreme but plausible exploratory scenarios towards a post-carbon society have been defined, having a 2005-2050 horizon: Induced mobility or Hyper-mobility, Constrained mobility, Decoupled mobility, and Reduced mobility. These exploratory scenarios complement the scenarios previously described as reference scenarios for the 2005-2030 period. Exploratory scenarios are comprehensive, covering all socioeconomic, transport and environmental aspects, and were first defined qualitatively. They were modelled by ad-hoc foresight models based on TRANS-TOOLS results (or meta-models) and then validated against other available forecasts.

23. These four scenarios were compared against other scenarios defined in future-based studies, in relation to economic development, social balance and environmental sustainability. While the four scenarios cover economic development and extreme social balance areas (they could be stereotyped as “happy growth”, “unhappy growth”, “happy decline”, “unhappy decline”), all of them attempt to be environmentally friendly.

24. “Moving together” or Decoupled mobility is the continuation of the 2005-2030 “High growth and stable population” scenario, combining relatively high economic growth with strong social sustainability. Balanced policies are applied, with emphasis on pricing and modal shift and public-private partnerships. There is an overall optimism in the capacity of public institutions to implement cost-effective policies, and adapt themselves according to the subsidiarity principle.

25. “Moving less” or Reduced mobility is the continuation of the 2005-2030 “Low growth and declining population” scenario, combining weak economic growth with strong social and environmental sustainability. Behavioural policies reducing demand for motorised transport are applied. Strict speed limits on roads and land-use regulations lead to an increase in public transport. Long-distance traffic is reduced.

26. “Moving alone” or Induced mobility is independent from reference scenarios. It assumes high growth and a small increase of population due to immigration from 2005 to 2050. It combines strong economic growth with weak social sustainability. There is a strong emphasis on technology, supply-side management and spontaneous market self-organisation.

27. “Stop moving” or Constrained mobility assumes very high growth and an increase of population due to migration until 2030, and then a “bottleneck” is reached because of structural reasons. These might be a lack of public investment in infrastructure or the failure to implement new technologies, leading to a dramatic reduction of private profitability and hard economic decline. It is attached to a pessimistic vision concerning the capacity of Europeans to carry out structural reforms. From 2030 to 2050, the scenario combines weak economic growth with weak social sustainability. Non-cost-effective regulations and bans are applied to constrain mobility, in order to release congestion and reduce emissions, such as strict and expensively priced Emission Trade Markets. The economy is depressed, and transport prices and taxes cannot be raised. This scenario can be understood as a failing “Moving alone” (or Induced mobility) scenario.

28. The aim of these four scenarios illustrates that there are different paths toward a post-carbon society. It may be possible to achieve higher sustainability and economic growth together, if a balanced development of technology or of social organisation is achieved, or if there is a voluntary reduction of mobility. Failure during the process is also possible. There is a fourth scenario that shows the risks of not achieving a technological fix or the necessary structural reforms to facilitate its implementation at the right time. The consistency of these qualitative hypotheses was secured by the use of TRANS-TOOLS 2005-2030 and its meta-models for the 2005-2050 period.

29. Meta-models are foresight tools that integrate 2005 TRANS-TOOLS data, and are calibrated with TRANS-TOOLS forecasts 2005-2030 and validated against other forecasts for 2020 and 2050. They are multisectoral, focused on the long-term and dynamic. Meta-models are an approximation of TRANS-TOOLS for 2005-2030 and an extension for 2030-2050. Meta-models also complement TRANS-TOOLS with information not included in its current version but needed for long-term assessment. The meta-model requires less computer resources and can be run intensively under controlled parameters to reveal what affects performance in the system, in this way it is better suited for backcasting exercises. Meta-models can also be understood as a policy-interface for TRANS-TOOLS.

30.  The main objective of the meta-models is to produce CO2 emissions in the 2050 scenario, and trace back the path combining trends and policies to 2005. While TRANS-TOOLS produces results for a given time horizon (like 2020 or 2030), meta-models produce results for every year during the whole period of study.

31. In order to calibrate meta-models with TRANS-TOOLS, the qualitative narrative of the exploratory scenarios was translated into the TRANS-TOOLS main transport variables in two scenarios: The Decoupled scenario into the “high growth” scenario and the Reduced into a “low growth” scenario. The 2005-2030 baseline was extended to the 2030-2050 period. The other two exploratory scenarios (Induced and Constrained, distant from mainstream tendencies modelled by TRANS-TOOLS) were validated by comparison with the others.

32. The variables calibrated were the absolute values of traffic by mode for passengers and transport provided by TRANS-TOOLS in 2005 and 2030, and validated for 2020, assuming the same values in relation to socioeconomic variables.) For 2020 and 2050 the Baseline scenario was also validated against other available forecasts. Elasticity of transport to GDP for different type of trips, such as total trips within the EU-27 made by residents and tourists and visitors, EU-27 residents travelling within the EU-27 and abroad, etc., were validated against different sources, and finally the CO2 emissions in 2005 was validated against the DG TREN statistical pocketbook values. The main difficulty of the exercise was to compare values corresponding to slightly different indicators that measure the same concept.

33. Decoupled scenario (Organisation policy-path): population is expected to increase to 545m, while the economy measured by GDP will see annual growth of 2.4%. Passenger traffic measured in pax-km will increase by 1.2% per year, while freight will grow faster, at about 1.7% per year. Rail share will increase noticeably from 6% to 20% in the case of passenger share. There is a gradual process of CO2 reduction, up to 61% in respect to 2005 levels.

34. “Moving less” or Reduced mobility (Behavioural policy-path): the population is expected to decrease to 431m, while the economy measured in terms of GDP will see a slow 1.2% annual growth. Passenger traffic measured in pax-km will only increase by 0.5% per year, while freight will almost stagnate at 0.2% per year. Share of rail freight will increase from 12% to 17%. There is a fast process of CO2 reduction, since the early stages, leading to a 61% reduction in 2050, not much different from the Decoupled scenario.

35. “Moving alone” or Induced mobility (Technological policy-path): the population is expected to increase to 545M, while the economy measured in terms of GDP will grow annually by 2.6%. Passenger traffic measured in pax-km will increase by 2.3% per year, while freight will grow faster, at about 2.9% per year. Air share will increase from 7% to 9% in the case of passenger, and road will move from 46% to 50% for freight. CO2 emissions are reduced mostly because of new technologies, and therefore CO2 still grows during the firsts years but still reaches a reduction of 56% in 2050.

36. “Stop moving” or Constrained mobility (Mandatory policy-path): the population is expected to decrease to 488m, while the economy measured in terms of GDP will see an average growth of 1.3% per year. Passenger traffic measured in pax-km will increase by 1.1% per year, while freight will grow only 0.6%. Rail share will increase from 6% to 14% in the case of passenger, but road will be dominant for freight, increasing the share up to 52%. CO2 emissions will rise until 2030 but then will go down– about 36% in respect to 2005 levels.

37. The exploratory scenarios are plausible alternative paths to a 50% direct CO2 reduction in 2050 (even the Contrained scenario could be, if adjusted). It is more difficult to achieve the 10% reduction target in 2020.

38. Total passenger motorised transport with origin or destination in the EU-27 (measured in pax-km) will keep growing, following previous patterns. There is no empiric evidence found against this long-term invariant. Passenger traffic will grow following the travel time and budget constraints (approximately 15% of personal available income allocated in transport, in average) for all scenarios. Depending on GDP per capita and the evolution of transport costs, passengers will travel more or less (in pax-km). This reflects the fact that personal mobility is not purely driven by economic aspects. While daily commuting trips may remain stable, business, personal visits and leisure trips abroad will grow faster.

39. The elasticity of transport to GDP depends very much on the types of trips. When considering trips made by EU-27 residents inside EU-27 territory the growth rate is relatively low, less than 1.3% per year. The addition of trips made in EU-27 territory by non-residents, generally trips with origin or destination outside the EU-27, increases the growth rate slightly up to 1.45% per year. The main difference arises when including the trips made by EU-27 residents outside EU territory, increasing the annual growth up to 2.1%.

40. In European economic integration, national borders still matter, as well as language and cultural backgrounds. Only 2% of Europeans live and work in other European countries. Cross-border short-distance traffic remains marginal. International relations between European countries grow less than could be expected, given the geographic proximity and the common market, in relation to the growth of traffic between European countries and countries outside the EU-27.

41. Total motorised freight transport with origin or destination in the EU-27 (measured in tn-km) will keep growing, following previous patterns, but the elasticity to GDP changes depending on the scenario. In the case of the Reduced scenario, the elasticity decreases while in the Induced it grows slightly in relation to previous trends. The elasticity has significant differences in relation to type of products.

42. For freight, the elasticity to GDP very much depends on the type of movement considered. When only considering freight with origin and destination within EU-27 territory, the growth rate is low, less than 1.2% per year. The addition of freight with origin or destination in EU-27 neighbouring countries (except northern Africa) increases the growth rate to 2.25% per year, mainly due to the great amount of oil, coal and other fuels moved by sea mode coming from Norway and Russia.

43. Freight transport for shorter distances is dominated by minerals and building material. For longer distances, it is more mixed with machinery and other manufacturing, especially for the more industrialised zones. Crude oil, oil derivatives and to a lesser extent solid mineral fuels are important in the long distances.

44. Passenger transport is largely dominated by regional transport, which includes commuter and urban trips. The shorter, regional, distances  are divided in equal parts between commuter, private and holiday. Private and business gain importance at national level while long-distance transport is dominated by holiday trips. Domestic transport is the one who grows the least and long distance the most.

45. There are no major changes in the relation between trips and trip-km for road passenger traffic, meaning that trips do not become significantly longer or shorter in the future. In almost every scenario, there is a relative reduction of vehicle-km, due to the improvement in occupancy rates. This is not the case of the Induced scenario where development of new private unipersonal vehicles is important. just the opposite happens in the Reduced scenario where there is a reduction on veh-km, even with an increase on pax-km.

46. Important changes are expected in the different transport market segments. Transport demand with both origin and destination within Europe is expected to grow less than the economy, for both passengers and freight, and especially in northern and central regions.  Overseas traffic is expected to grow much faster, measured in pax-km and tn-km, since other measures, such as trips or veh-km, do not necessarily follow the same patterns. A reduction in the number of trips may result in an increase of trips-km if the composition of trips changes and trips have longer distances, producing more or less veh-km depending on the evolution of occupancy ratios and load-factors. This will happen for all scenarios, with different intensities for urban and interurban traffic, in different zones of Europe.

47. Passenger transport at the regional level (NUTS3) will tend to be decoupled from economic growth, as well as domestic (NUTS0) traffic, that will grow at an even lower rate than regional traffic, for the Baseline evolution and, with small differences in all the other scenarios. International passenger trips inside the EU-27 will grow following economic growth (in pax-km), and trips from/to outside the EU-27 will grow faster than economic growth.

48. Technological improvements leading to faster and cheaper air services between Europe and America, or Asia, may result in greater increases of overseas traffic. Intercontinental flights and flights with neighbouring countries will have an important impact on major European airports. Large European airports may grow as much as it is feasible, but an interconnected network of medium-size airports and HST connections will likely be needed.

49. Freight traffic between the EU-27 and the rest of the world in 2005 represented roughly 86% of the total traffic generated or attracted by the EU-27 (tn-km, including the movements to overseas). Only 14% is freight traffic within the EU-27, with origin and destination within the EU-27. In 2050, traffic with the rest of the world may represent more than 90%.

50. If measured in value instead of weight, freight traffic is likely to grow much faster than GDP if current trends continue. As a reference, in the 2000-2007 period the GDP grew at 2.1% per year, the weight of freight 2.9% per year and the value of freight 5.5% per year.

51. In 2005, 35% of inland EU-27 freight traffic was imports or exports from overseas. They will be almost 50% in 2030, and in 2050 are expected to grow to 65%. This means that European ports and freight corridors near large ports and urban centres will be increasingly busy. While many European ports are increasing their infrastructure, the connections to their hinterlands should be upgraded by dedicated freight services to improve their efficiency, mostly by rail in the short term.

52. The footprint of Europe in the rest of the world measured in terms of CO2 direct emissions due to transport activities is relatively high in the present, about 45% of total CO2 emissions generated by both Europeans travelling more often overseas, and imports and exports, and it is expected to grow in the future.

53. The average passenger trip will become longer, as more intra-European trips and relatively less regional and domestic trips will be made. Trips increase 1% annually in the Baseline scenario up to 2030, while pax-km increases 1.9% in the same period. Pax-km of trips with neighbouring countries grows at 6% annually, increasing the share of total pax-km in the EU-27 from 3% to 9%.

54. Freight trips will likely become longer as the share of intra-European and extra-EU-27 trips increase against regional and domestic movements. Lifted tonnes may increase slowly, but the increase in ton-km is much higher for all scenarios, caused by the economic integration of Eastern European countries and the globalisation process, meaning an increase in overseas imports and exports.