

# RUSSIA AND THE DUAL EXPANSION OF EUROPE<sup>1</sup>

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## INTRODUCTION

In June 1997, the European Council, meeting in Amsterdam, recommended that the European Commission should begin negotiations for membership of the European Union (EU) with the governments of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. A month later, at a NATO summit meeting in Madrid, invitations were issued to the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks. A process began of separating Europe into 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. For no matter how frequently NATO and EU officials say that they do not intend to redivide Europe, and no matter how many 'partnership' agreements they offer to non-members, it is inevitable that admitting some countries to full membership of the two organisations and excluding others will produce 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Those countries that are neither EU 'accession' states (the shorthand term used to refer to the six states in the process of negotiation membership), nor 'pre-ins' (as Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta were categorised in October 1999 when the European Commission proposed opening negotiations for their accession)<sup>2</sup>, are, by definition, 'outsiders'. Being 'outside' affects the way people perceive themselves and their environment. It also affects their relationships with both 'insiders' and fellow 'outsiders'. Exclusion from the expanding NATO alliance influences outsiders' security perceptions and the way they view their role in Europe. The perception of exclusion, therefore, has important consequences for the domestic and foreign policies of outsider states.

Russia is the most important example of an excluded state, if only because of its size and strategic significance. Notwithstanding Acting President Vladimir Putin's widely

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  2. A 'differentiated' approach will be taken towards the 'pre-ins', which will take account of each candidate's progress towards meeting the criteria for membership. See 'Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, October 13, 1999. IP/99/751', Retrieved 29 April 2000. <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_10\\_99/intro/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/intro/index.htm)> 2000.

quoted throw away remark to David Frost on 5 March that he can see no reason why Russia should not join NATO in due course, the Russian government does not seek EU or NATO membership.<sup>3</sup> It does not object to EU enlargement, and does not mind if some of the Soviet successor states join the EU. It is vehemently opposed to NATO expansion, however. It protested very strongly against the first round of expansion, and it opposes any further extension of membership, particularly if former Soviet states are permitted to join. NATO expansion affects Russia's relationship both with the alliance itself, and with those Soviet successor states that wish to join NATO or which appear to prefer better relations with it than with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent states.

The EU and NATO have attempted to allay the anxiety of the Russian government about the enlargement of the organisations. The EU concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia in June 1994, for example, but its ratification was delayed because of the first war in Chechnya and it only came into force on 1 December 1997. The EU Treaty of Amsterdam (adopted in June 1997) introduced a new policy instrument: common strategies to be implemented in fields where EU Member States share important interests. When the Treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999, the first common strategy adopted by the European Council in June 1999 was the Common Strategy on Russia. The Russian government responded later that year with its own 'Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)'.<sup>4</sup>

Russia was a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) from March 1992 and it became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which succeeded it in 1997. When NATO launched its Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in 1994, Russia signed a PfP Framework Document on 22 June 1994. And when NATO Heads of State and Government decided to enlarge NATO, they also began to negotiate a separate charter with Russia, making great efforts to ensure that it was adopted before the formal accession of new members. On 27 May 1997 the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed by the Secretary General of NATO and Heads of State and Government of NATO and the Russian President in Paris.<sup>5</sup>

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3. In conversation with three Russian journalists, Putin maintained that Russia would not want to be a member of NATO in its present form. However, if NATO were transformed into a primarily political organisation, membership would be worth discussing. *Ot pervogo litsa: Rasgovory s Vladimirom Putinyom* (Moscow, Vargrius, 2000), p. 159.
  4. For Russia's PCA agreement, see Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ L 327, 28/11/1997. The EU's Common Strategy on Russia is published in OJ L 15, 4/06/1999. For Russia's Medium-Term Strategy, see The Finnish Presidency, 'Unofficial translation by the Russian MFA of the "Medium-term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)" presented by the Russian side at the EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki on 22 October 1999'. <<http://presidency.finland.fi/frame.asp>> Retrieved 29 April 2000.
  5. The text of the Founding Act can be found at NATO Handbook. 1998 edition. NATO On-line Library. <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v070.htm>> Retrieved 29 April 2000.

These attempts by the EU and NATO to allay Russian anxiety have not prevented many Russians from feeling isolated and marginalised as enlargement gets under way. They cannot disguise the fact that a wider Europe is being created from which Russia is excluded. This chapter examines the effects of exclusion on Russian perceptions of Europe. It is based on the published views of the foreign policy community, on two focus groups conducted in September 1999, on interviews conducted in Moscow in September and in Kazan' in December 1999, and on the results of our first nation-wide survey commissioned in January 2000.<sup>6</sup> All the evidence indicates that Russians are deeply affected by exclusion from European expansion, but that they are more worried about NATO expansion than about the enlargement of the EU.

While there are distinctions can between the foreign policy views of 'liberal westernizers', 'pragmatic nationalists' and 'fundamentalist nationalists' in Russia, there are few genuine liberal westernizers left and none of them remain in policy-making positions.<sup>7</sup> In general, *liberal westernizers* favour a Western type of democratic market society for Russia and want good relations with Western countries. *Pragmatic nationalists* also endorse democracy and want good relations with the West, but they put Russian national interests first. They tend to believe that a market economy has to be adapted to specific Russian conditions. *Fundamentalist nationalists*, on the other hand, believe that Russia can forge its own, specific path of development. They see the West as hostile and are nostalgic for the Soviet (or even the Russian imperial) past.<sup>8</sup>

## RUSSIA and NATO

Liberal westernizers dominated Russian foreign policy immediately after the disintegration of the USSR; it was the issue of NATO expansion, above all that undermined their influence. Both pragmatic and fundamentalist nationalists blamed them for making too many concessions to the West, thus encouraging Western politicians to taking further advantage of Russia. One businessman we interviewed, for

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6. We interviewed foreign policy élites; in other words, senior party officials, members of the Duma and Federal Council foreign policy committees; prominent businessmen, senior officials in key ministries. The participants of the focus groups, on the other hand, were ordinary people, of mixed gender, age, and education. The full project will examine the effect of exclusion on Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as well as on Russia. Apart from approximately 140 élite interviews in the four countries, data will be obtained from nation-wide opinion surveys and 16 focus groups (including 4 among military personnel).
  7. These terms are used in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison & Margot Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996) to categorise views about Russian foreign policy. They are used for convenience and are not intended as strict categories, since there are overlaps between them categories, and some individuals change their views over time.
  8. A detailed blueprint is offered, for example, in Alexei Podberezkin, *Russkii put'*, 4th ed. (Moscow, RAU-Universitet, 1999). Mr Podberezkin was a candidate in the March 2000 presidential elections; he gained 0.13 percent of the vote, coming tenth of the eleven candidates.

example, maintained that Andrei Kozyrev, the most prominent liberal westernizer and Russia's first foreign minister, had defended Western, not Russian interests. Another of our interviewees accused Kozyrev of having made 'unforgivable mistakes' as foreign minister. When Russia's membership of the Partnership for Peace was debated, liberal westernizers favoured signing up, pragmatic nationalists were hesitant, and fundamentalist nationalists were unambiguously opposed. On the subject of NATO expansion, however, they were united, even if they had different reasons for objecting.<sup>9</sup> Whatever his private views, Kozyrev, like Russian officials and politicians of all persuasions, used every available public opportunity to express Russia's opposition whenever the possibility of NATO enlargement was mooted. After a faux pas in Warsaw when he told President Walesa that Russia did not mind if Poland joined NATO, President Yeltsin also consistently made it clear that he disapproved of NATO expansion. Moreover, the Russian public believed that NATO expansion would harm Russia: in an October 1996 poll, 32 per cent thought that expansion would be bad for Russia; in March /April 1997, of the 22 per cent of respondents who were reasonably well-informed about NATO, 62 per cent thought that expansion of the alliance would harm Russia.<sup>10</sup>

The NATO-Russia Founding Act was intended to reassure Russia that cooperation between Russia and the alliance would continue even if enlargement proceeded. But the ground for future disagreement was laid when it became clear that whereas President Yeltsin interpreted the Act to mean that NATO would have to consult Russia in the Permanent Joint Russia-NATO Council, NATO leaders insisted, as President Clinton expressed it, that Russia would have 'a voice in but not a veto over NATO's business.'<sup>11</sup> Moreover, while many people in the West seemed to think that by signing the Act, the Russian government had signalled its tacit acceptance of NATO expansion, this did not at all correspond to the Russian interpretation. Public criticism of expansion did not abate. The public response to expansion was extremely negative (66 per cent in a July 1999 poll believed that it represented a direct threat to Russia). Russian analysts, on the other hand, considered expansion a 'strategic error', but they understood that Russia could not prevent it occurring. At the beginning of 1999, it looked briefly as if Russians had accepted the inevitable.<sup>12</sup>

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9. For the liberal westernizer arguments about PfP, see the article by A. Konovalov and S.Oznobishchev in *Segodnya*, 26 March 1994. Alexei Pushkov's interview with Vladimir Lukin in *Moskovskie novosti*, No. 16, 1994 gives the pragmatic nationalist doubts. See also Alexander Sergounin, *Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms*. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers, 4, 1997, p. 52.

10. 'Opinion Analysis', Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, Washington, D.C., January 24, 1997, M-12-97 and May 27, 1997, M-87-97.

11. President Yeltsin's remarks are quoted in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 28 May 1997; President Clinton's Rose Garden speech appears in NATO, *The US Mission, President Clinton Hails NATO-Russia Agreement*.  
<<http://www.nato.int/usa/president/s970514c.htm>> Retrieved 1 November 1999.

12. Boris Kazantsev, 'Posledstviya rasshireniya NATO', *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 11-12, 1997, p. 20. See also I. Maksimychev, 'K kakim beregam plyvet Evropa', *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 10, 1997, pp. 29-36; P. Ivanov and B. Khalosha, 'Rossiya-NATO: chto dal'she', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 6, 1999, pp. 5-15.

The formal accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic to NATO in March, followed by the adoption of a new strategic concept at the 50th anniversary NATO Summit in Washington, and the announcement that the door to NATO membership remains open caused further consternation.<sup>13</sup> Kosovo was the final straw. NATO's use of military force was not discussed by the UN Security Council and nor did NATO consult the Russian government in the Joint Russia-NATO Council. To Russians this seemed to forebode that NATO was intent on denying Russia a voice on important European security issues. The attack on Serbia confirmed the prejudices of those who held fundamentalist nationalist views, and it undermined more moderate views. NATO had, in Russian eyes, ceased to be a defence alliance. Moreover, its new strategic doctrine implied that it might, in future, intervene in the conflicts on the periphery of Russia. During interviews with the foreign policy élite in September, our interlocutors across the political spectrum condemned the airstrikes against Serbia, disapproved of NATO expansion, and argued that the new strategic doctrine undermined Russian security. One fundamentalist nationalist in Moscow, for example, claimed that the attack on Serbia revealed NATO in its true colours; another argued that the conflict in Yugoslavia was simply a testing ground for further attacks that NATO intended to undertake. Pragmatic nationalists pointed out that Kosovo had persuaded the army and the general public that NATO's new strategy represented a direct threat to Russia. Angry protests about NATO's action were still being voiced in December 1999. In Kazan', for example, an interviewee expressed the view that 'the US now openly says it wants to rule the world'; he believed that the US was using NATO as an instrument to reach that goal. In separate interviews in Moscow and Yekaterinburg in December, which had nothing to do with foreign policy, interlocutors invariably criticised NATO policy in the Balkans.<sup>14</sup>

Focus group discussions confirmed that Kosovo had made a deep and negative impression on people at all levels of society. They also revealed that NATO and the United States were widely seen as synonymous. Oddly, even among the élite, far less blame for the attack on Serbia was attached to European NATO members than to the US. NATO is 'being used by the US to weaken Western Europe', said a history lecturer in Kazan', and 'in essence, the EU was subservient to NATO and the Americans' in the Kosovo conflict.

Russians are deeply concerned that NATO might expand further, particularly to include the Baltic states or Ukraine. Again, this concern is prevalent at all levels of society. In our January 2000 survey 37 per cent of respondents thought that Baltic membership of NATO would present a threat (a large threat or some threat) to Russia, while only 17 per cent saw it as no threat, and 35 per cent did not know. Curiously, however, a large majority – 75 per cent – thought it unlikely that Russia would be attacked in the next five years, and only 24 per cent thought an attack likely. Nevertheless, 60 per cent of

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13. The new strategic concept and the Membership Action Plan are published in *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23-25 April 1999* (NATO Office of Information and Press Brussels, 1999).

14. These interviews were part of a project conducted by the European Institute for the Media that monitored the media coverage of the Russian parliamentary elections. The project was funded by the European Commission through the Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.

those polled thought that Russia should increase its spending on defence – but they were responding as much to the war in Chechnya (which they strongly supported – 71 per cent supported the campaign entirely or in part, while 9 per cent opposed it) as to the expansion of NATO. When it came to how Russia should respond to NATO expansion, however, realism prevailed. Among the foreign policy élite, fundamentalist nationalists and a few pragmatic nationalists predicted a strong Russian response, suggesting variously that military spending would rise, there would be a new arms race, the ‘nuclear factor’ would be ‘reconsidered’, and new allies would be found. For the most part, however, interviewees understood that economic weakness limits Russia’s ability to respond. One academic of liberal westernizer persuasion summed it up as follows: ‘Russia’s political leaders will have to take measures, but I can’t see what they can do. They have illusions, their rhetoric is strong, but there are no measures they could take. They may say that military spending will rise, but there is nowhere from which to take the money for military spending’.

## **RUSSIA and the EUROPEAN UNION**

Russian views about the European Union are generally positive and they contrast strongly with the widespread criticism levelled at NATO. EU enlargement seemed, at first, to be perceived as an acceptable alternative to NATO expansion, but even after NATO had expanded and the EU could no longer be seen an alternative, extension of EU membership to former socialist states was still regarded favourably. As Dmitri Trenin points out, there is a tendency in Russia ‘to contrast “the good West of Europe/EU” with the “bad West of America/NATO”’.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, very few people in Russia are informed about the European Union. International issues in general have a low profile in the media, compared to the attention given to the Russia’s turbulent domestic affairs. Relations with the EU are primarily economic and technical, not the dramatic stuff of news headlines, and European integration has no relevance to people’s daily life; consequently, the EU gets little media coverage.<sup>16</sup> This explains why public awareness is low, although given the amount of EU assistance which Russia receives, the European Commission might be disconcerted to discover how little awareness there is of what the EU does for Russia.<sup>17</sup> 69 percent of respondents in our survey at the end of January did not know

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15. Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia-EU Partnership: Grand Vision and Practical steps’, *Russia on Russia*, Moscow School of Political Studies, February 2000.

16. Igor Leshoukov, *Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Integration*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 26, 1998, Center for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, quote on p. 17. We are grateful to David Gowan for drawing our attention to this paper.

17. In 1990-1995, the EU was the largest donor to the newly independent states (NIS). Russia was the largest NIS recipient, receiving 16.4 per cent of Official Development Assistance and 43.4 per cent of Technical Assistance. See European Commission. ‘EU Cooperation with the New Independent States and Mongolia’. <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/nis/intro/index.htm>> Retrieved 30 April 2000. Total Tacis funding to Russia in 1991-1996 was ECU 927.89 million. The indicative budget allocation for Tacis assistance to Russia for 1996-1999 was ECU 0.6 billion. See European Commission. ‘TACIS Country Close-up, Russia’, <[http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/tacis/country\\_closeup/russia/cc\\_russ\\_indic.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/tacis/country_closeup/russia/cc_russ_indic.htm)>

where the headquarters of the EU are located (answering either 'don't know' or naming the wrong city). Only 20 percent assessed the actions and aims of the EU as very or fairly positive and, although only 11 percent assessed them as very or fairly negative, 69 percent responded that they either did not know anything about the EU's actions and aims, or that they did not know what they thought of them. On the other hand, nearly 48 percent of respondents thought that Russia would benefit if it joined the EU, only 12 percent thought that it would not benefit, while 40 percent thought it would make no difference.

Lack of knowledge about the EU among the general public may be understandable; after all, European publics themselves are poorly informed about it, and there is no reason why publics in non-member states should be any better informed. It is less comprehensible, however why some members of the Russian foreign policy community who, given their professional positions, ought to be better informed, seem to lack even name recognition of the EU. On the whole, people who identify with pragmatic nationalist views are better acquainted with the organisation than fundamentalist nationalists, one of whom told us that 'if a European Union is formed, then Russia must be part of it'. Among those who know something about the organisation, there is no apprehension about its enlargement, even if the Baltic countries join, as long as the EU does not attempt to 'force Russia into a corner', 'exclude it' or 'turn it into a pariah'. Some thought that enlargement would serve to draw Russia closer to the EU, and they believed that fulfilling EU demands and conditions would benefit the Russian economy. Thus, EU enlargement had the support of the general director of a successful factory which manufactures medical instruments who had adopted EU quality standards, and hoped to export even more goods. Other interviewees were rather more wary, warning of a possible return to a divided Europe. Very few were clear, however, about the potential hazards of an expanding market which excludes Russia. One of the few who understood the problem was a leading member of the Tatarstan parliament who feared that Russia might become isolated very quickly. He thought that 'after EU enlargement in the next five years, it will become more difficult for Russia to export to Poland and the Czech Republic, because of the high EU standard in these countries. For Russia this will mean a loss of several billions of dollars per year.'

Of course, officials in the relevant ministries who deal with EU expansion are well aware that EU enlargement may have negative economic consequences for Russia. The anti-dumping measures regularly initiated against Russian exports on the grounds that Russia is a state-trading country (although Russia's PCA refers to it as an economy in transition) have long been a source of friction. They know that problems will arise as the accession countries adopt the EU's *acquis communautaire*. As the accession countries and the 'pre-ins' gradually re-orientate their trade towards the EU, their trade relations with Russia will be adversely affected. At the same time, Russia's dependence on the EU, which currently receives 40 per cent of Russia's exports and provides 38 per cent of its imports, will grow. Although one journalist suggested to us that EU barriers would benefit Russia, since it would enable the government to re-establish the kind of protectionist policies which would revive Russia's real economy, this was not a view shared by these officials.

Of all the potential negative consequences of EU enlargement, the issue that causes most concern is movement across borders. There is growing concern among officials and the business community that when the CEE countries join the Schengen agreement, Russian citizens will require visas to travel. Moreover, it is not only the accession countries which will introduce stricter visa regimes. Under pressure from the EU, the pre-ins will also sign up. This is a particularly acute problem for Kaliningrad, which will in due course become a Russian enclave within the EU.<sup>18</sup>

Russia's Medium-Term Strategy (2000-2010) which was presented to the European Council in October 1999 reflects these concerns. Section 5 refers to 'the ambivalent impact' of enlargement on Russian interests and sets as a priority the task of 'achieving the best advantages' and 'preventing, eliminating or setting off possible adverse consequences' of enlargement. It calls for consultations to secure Russia's interests as the *acquis* is adopted in the CEE countries, and draws particular attention to Kaliningrad's problems.<sup>19</sup> Russian government officials are only now beginning to realise how complex the task is of negotiating and consulting with both the EU and the accession states and, particularly, of ensuring that there is sufficient coordination across relevant ministries.

At first the decision taken at the Cologne European Council to expand the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) made little impression in Russia.<sup>20</sup> Even when asked directly in September about what the implications would be for Russia, the foreign policy elite revealed little awareness of the EU's intention to develop a military capacity. No alarm was expressed. Foreign Ministry officials directly concerned with relations with the EU were better informed, but in September 1999 they seemed preoccupied by the consequences of exclusion to Russia's economic security, and relatively unconcerned about more traditional forms of security, particularly in relation to the EU. Of course, this may simply reflect the problem of compartmentalisation which is characteristic of most bureaucracies but which afflicts Russia particularly severely. In other words, they may have been unaware of the EU's plans because their business was the economy, while military security was dealt with in other departments, and there was effectively no communication between departments. But the people in defence-related fields whom we interviewed also knew very little about EU intentions with regard to security and defence.

The authors of Russia's Medium-Term Strategy were clearly well informed on the subject, however, and they took a positive view of the prospect of the CFSP acquiring a defence aspect. The preamble to the Strategy maintains that a 'strategic partnership'

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18. V. Pozdnyakov and S. Ganzha, 'Novye strany na poroge Evropeiskogo soyuza', *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, 3, 1999, pp. 37-44. On the EU's Kaliningrad dilemma, see Lyndelle D. Fairlie, *Will the EU use Northern Dimension to solve its Kaliningrad dilemma?*, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Papers 21, 1999.

19. See The Finnish Presidency, 'Unofficial translation by the Russian MFA of the "Medium-term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)" presented by the Russian side at the EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki on 22 October 1999', *op cit*.

20. We are extremely grateful to David Gowan for sharing both his sources on, and his understanding of, Russian perceptions of an expanded CSFP with us.

between Russia and the EU can achieve a pan-European system of collective security based on 'equality without dividing lines.' This system will not isolate the United States and NATO, but nor will it permit them to dominate the continent. The Medium-Term Strategy also calls, in Section 1.5.2, for practical cooperation with the WEU in the area of security 'which could counterbalance... the NATO-ism in Europe'.<sup>21</sup> In other words, a military aspect to the CFSP was perceived to offer an alternative European security structure, which would diminish NATO's importance in Europe.

In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the EU's planned military capacity acquired the name of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). It was still not perceived in Russia as representing a threat. On the contrary, the National Security Blueprint, which was drafted and discussed in 1999 and adopted in January 2000, includes an extensive list of 'fundamental threats [to Russian security] in the international sphere'. It does not mention the European Union at all. Neither does Russia's new military doctrine which was adopted in April 2000.<sup>22</sup> Russia's Medium Term EU Strategy indicates a tendency among officials to believe that the CESDP will provide a means by which Russia can cooperate with the EU in security matters and, at the same time, use to drive a wedge between the European members of NATO and the United States. More sophisticated Russian analysts pointed out, however, that Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were in danger of reverting to the kind of zero-sum thinking that was characteristic of the Soviet Union. In particular, they were deceiving themselves in thinking that the Western system was a kind of balance in which 'increasing the "European" weight would automatically weaken the American side of the balance'. In fact, increasing the European weight was only possible because it would not undermine the Transatlantic link.<sup>23</sup>

The appointment of the former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, as the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy supported this warning. It was highly unlikely that the person who had designed and implemented NATO expansion would take responsibility for an EU policy that was directed towards diminishing or undermining NATO's influence in Europe. Moreover, EU officials emphasised that the CESDP was intended as an addition, not an alternative, to NATO. EU High Commissioner for External Affairs, Chris Patten, for example, insisted – calling himself both a committed European and a committed Atlantist – that the EU was seeking to strengthen the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Solana also argued, 'as a former Secretary-General' of NATO, that the CESDP would not replace the Alliance. On the contrary, he insisted, 'an effective CFSP will be to the advantage of NATO...[but] NATO will remain the foundation for the collective defence of its members'. European leaders have made clear, he added, that the objective of the Union is to develop the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged'.<sup>24</sup>

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21. Medium-Term Strategy, *op cit*.

22. 'Kontsepsiya Natsional'noi Bezopasnosti' (The Concept of National Security), *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye*, 14 January 2000; 'Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 22 April 2000.

23. Dmitrii Danilov, 'Potentsial'nyi soyuznik Moskvyy', *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye*, No. 47, 1999.

24. The Rt Hon Chris Patten, speech/99/174 to the WEU Council of Ministers

Once it became clear that the CESDP was intended to supplement NATO, Russian policy makers became less sure about the advantages of the EU developing a military potential. They may also have been taken by surprise at the rapidity with which developments in the security field advanced. Their own experience within the Commonwealth of Independent States suggested that agreements and treaties were difficult to make in multilateral bodies, and even more difficult to implement. Moreover, the long delay between signature and ratification of the Russia-EU PCA, and the lengthy negotiations on which the accession countries were engaged, may have led them to believe that progress on CESDP would be slow and difficult. In any case, CESDP as an addition, not an alternative, to NATO seemed to signal the possibility of even further isolation for Russia. Moreover, it might require a reassessment of their previous positive response to EU membership for former Soviet states. The Military Doctrine lists, as one of Russia's main external threats, 'the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the Russian Federation's military security'.<sup>25</sup> The CESDP gives the EU many of the attributes of a military alliance and, seen as an augmentation of NATO, it may be perceived as detrimental to Russia's military security when it includes new EU members such as Estonia.

At the time of writing, some Russian analysts still believe that the CESDP offers a means by which Russia can continue cooperating with the West despite the tension between it and NATO. Other analysts argue that the Russia-EU security dialogue cannot act as a substitute for the Russia-NATO relationship. The latter argue that Russia's first priority ought to be re-engaging with NATO, for only when it has re-engaged, will it be able to establish a constructive relationship with the CESDP.<sup>26</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Russian policy makers frequently contrast the multipolar international system which became a possibility after the Cold War and which Russia supports, to the unipolar world which they believe that the US now wishes to construct and dominate. Unipolarity has acquired such significance as the symbol of a world from which Russia's voice is excluded that the new Military Doctrine defines 'attempts to ignore (infringe) the Russian Federation's interests in resolving international security problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one influential centre in a multipolar world' as one of the main threats to Russian security.<sup>27</sup>

NATO is perceived as an instrument of US foreign policy, and one of the chief means by which the US intends to achieve unipolarity. The expansion of the alliance enhanced the perception, and the attack on Serbia confirmed it. Again, the Military Doctrine indicates how seriously these events affected Russian perceptions. The first

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Luxembourg, 23 November 1999; Javier Solana, 'The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the role of the High Representative', Danish Institute of International Affairs Copenhagen, 11 February 2000; and see Presidency reports to the Helsinki European Council, Bulletin EU 12-1999.

25. 'Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii', *op. cit.*

26. See Dmitrii Danilov, *op cit* for the first views, and Dmitri Trenin, *op cit.*, for the second.

27. 'Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii', *op. cit.*

two factors listed as destabilising Russia's military-political environment are 'attempts to weaken (ignore) the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily, the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe)' and 'the use of coercive military actions as a means of "humanitarian intervention" without the sanction of the UN Security Council'.<sup>28</sup>

The CESDP seemed, at first, to offer an alternative security system for Europe, one more acceptable to Russia. When it became apparent that CESDP is intended to complement NATO, Russian responded less positively to it. Paradoxically, however, one reason why EU officials, particularly Chris Patten and Javier Solana, found it necessary to insist that CESDP would enhance and not undermine NATO, was the fact that Russia saw it as a wedge which might be used to divide the European members of NATO from the United States.

Western analysts and policy makers sometimes react as if Russia's hopes to use CESDP as a wedge are unnatural rather than simply unwelcome. They interpret it as a return to the Soviet past, or at least a sign of the potential danger that Russia might represent to European security. In fact, when faced by a perceived hostile and superior force, the rational response is to try to divide it. In other words, it would be unnatural if Russian policy makers did *not* to try to divide what they perceive as a dangerous opposition. Moreover, it was not only the Soviet Union which used this tactic in the past. It was used just as frequently by the West in its relationship with the Soviet bloc.

The important point, however, is that wedge-driving is a rational response to a perceived *hostile* alliance. The way to prevent it, therefore, is to alleviate the perception of hostility that makes it a rational response. The EU's assurances that the CESDP will complement NATO exacerbate Russia's perception of exclusion from an enlarging hostile alliance rather than alleviating it. In other words, if the EU wishes to prevent wedge-driving on the part of Russia, it should put more effort into improving the relationship between NATO and Russia. One way in which it might do this is to use its good offices to reactivate the NATO-Russia Joint Council. It should also ensure that the determination expressed in section 3 of the EU's Common Strategy on Russia, to 'develop cooperation with Russia in the new European Security Architecture'<sup>29</sup>, is translated into policy.

EU assurances that the CESDP will complement NATO are not only intended to deter Russia from attempting to divide European NATO members from the United States. They are also directed towards the United States. While the US likes the fact that the CESDP might make Europe shoulder a fairer share of the Western defence burden, the idea that it could undermine NATO's predominant role in European security is far from welcome. In fact, the US and the Russian Federation have diametrically opposite reactions to the CESDP. The more the CESDP seems an alternative to NATO, the less welcome it is to the United States, and the more attractive it is to Russia – and vice versa. Since Europe itself is ambivalent – it wants to pull its international weight by having an effective CFSP, but fears that America might revert to a policy of isolationism and withdraw from NATO and Europe – the only way out of

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28. Ibid.

29. OJ L 15, 24/06/1999.

the general dilemma is to ensure that the relationship between NATO and Russia improves.

President Putin has declared that there is nothing to prevent cooperation between Russia and NATO 'if [Russia] is treated as an equal partner'.<sup>30</sup> Treating Russia as an equal need not imply giving it a veto over alliance policy, but it clearly requires doing more to ensure that Russia's voice is heard within NATO than members have been prepared to do up to now. But both sides have to cooperate if the NATO-Russian relationship is to improve. President Putin and his government also have a responsibility to foster cooperation. They need, at least, to make a greater effort to understand the nature of the dilemma and the role they play in producing it. They might also recall the insights of Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new political thinking', in particular, in relation to the effect Soviet rhetoric had on producing the 'enemy images' that underpinned the Cold War.<sup>31</sup> Applying the precepts of Soviet 'new political thinking' to some of the more hard-line public statements about international relations (for example, those made by people such as Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the international relations department of the Russian Ministry of Defence<sup>32</sup>) might improve the opportunities for cooperation.

EU, NATO and Russian policy makers, therefore, all have similar responsibilities with regard to cooperation. There can be no European security without Russia, nor is European security feasible without the United States. And since the US security role in Europe is enacted via NATO, all three sets of policy makers must concentrate on improving the cooperation between NATO and Russia.

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30. *Ot pervogo litsa, op. cit.*, p. 159.

31. See, for example, V. Petrovsky, 'Doverie i vyzhivanie chelovechestva (Trust and the survival of humanity)', *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, No. 11, 1987, pp. 15-26 and Shevardnadze's speech at a conference of diplomats in *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR*, No. 15, 15 August 1988, pp. 27-46.

32. In a speech to the Duma on 24 April 2000, Colonel-General Ivashov accused the United States of being behind the war in Chechnya and manoeuvring to thwart Russian military operations in Chechnya. Reported by BBC Monitoring International Reports from Interfax news agency.  
<<http://www.globalarchive.ft.com/search-components/index.jsp>> Retrieved 30 April 2000.

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