

## **9. Thematic prospective scenarios 'Socio-cultural evolution and integration'**

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### **9.1 Scenario base 'Socio-cultural evolution and integration'**

#### **9.1.1 Present situation, trends and forecasts**

Socio-cultural issues are as numerous and as diversified as European society itself. They include a wide range of factors which strongly interfere with demography and economy, but have their individual characteristics and dynamics.

They are related to 'large-scale' issues such as the impact of globalisation on the lifestyles, the relationships between ethnic or religious groups, immigration from outside Europe and also terrorism. They also concern the increasing social divide with its growing negative impacts in the field of poverty, social exclusion and crime. The transition which has taken place in Central and Eastern Europe from the former communist regimes towards democracy and market economy has been accompanied by a thorough transformation of socio-cultural values and systems. A number of issues have more regional or local roots, in particular in the case of cultural and ethnic minorities. Most socio-cultural issues have strong territorial impacts.

Opinions about the impacts of globalisation on the socio-cultural evolution of Europe are strongly diverging. The most widely spread opinion is that in a global society the risk is high that Europe has no identity any more. Globalisation, driven by technological development, is changing people's life globally, their customs and institutions and their views on the future. The human existence perspective is being narrowed by the technological imperative to concentrate on economic and political utility. On the other hand, Europe has the ability to become a key actor on the globalisation process thanks to its human capital stock, its historical roots, its capacity of overcoming intercultural tensions and its environment-friendly attitude. Another aspect is that the economy being far ahead of culture in terms of integration, globalisation is also perceived as a danger to weaken identities, prompting local cultures to defend themselves from the emerging global culture. The widespread anti-globalisation movements and even the revival of religious fanaticism are signs of this problem.

The lifestyles of Europeans are changing and becoming more differentiated over time. During the decades of high economic growth in the post-war period, the western world experienced consumerism as the dominating lifestyle. During the 1980s and 1990s, lifestyles have changed under the pressures of economic constraints and growing unemployment as well as under the emergence of environmental consciousness. Other factors led to strong differentiation of lifestyles in Europe. The most important factor has been sustained immigration from outside the EU and largely from outside Europe (North Africa, Black Africa, Middle East, Asia etc.) which has generated a multicultural society in Europe. Although their importance varies among European countries, large ethnic and religious groups of non-European origin are present all over Europe and their size is

increasing because of both continuing immigration and higher birth rates than in the native European population. Not only Western Europe is concerned. In central and eastern Europe, the apparition of immigration as a mass phenomenon (from the Far East, and South-West Asia, from the ex-USSR, from Africa and from the Balkan countries) is important. The cultural differences among the various ethnic groups have impacts on the lifestyles.

Demographic changes, in particular population ageing, also influence the lifestyles. There are for instance clear indications of increasing mobility and different consumption pattern of the aged.

Consumption patterns are an important component of lifestyles. These are undergoing substantial changes. More and more people in Europe are coming to the awareness that an ever-improving economy can no longer be expected. They design their lifestyle without the expectation of continuing economic growth and therefore pursuit security and adopt a more passive, but rational attitude towards consumption. Quality is progressively becoming more important than quantity and volatility. In the past decades, ecological awareness has been instrumental in bringing about changes in production, products and consumption patterns. It has curbed, but not more, the tremendous waste in manufacturing, marketing and usage of the products. An increasing trend can however be observed towards ecological and ethical consumption. There are nevertheless considerable differences among social and ethnic groups.

In the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the situation is quite different as regards the history of consumption patterns. These countries were not affected by the consumerism wave which flooded Europe from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s. On the contrary, consumption was severely constrained by the former regimes. Since the beginning of the 1990s, consumption patterns attempt to catch up, but are still limited by the purchase power. Simultaneously, these countries are also subject to the new consumption trends and changes which take place at global scale, so that an overlapping of contradictory trends can be observed there.

In addition to consumption patterns, mobility patterns are also shaping the lifestyles and are equally subject to structural changes. In general terms, people's mobility has been steadily increasing and diversifying as far as the purposes are concerned. As far as work-related mobility is concerned, a number of contradictory trends exist. The globalisation of production and trade systems increases the long-distance mobility of professionals. At local level, commuter flows are also growing in distance and in volume as a result of progressing suburbanisation. On the other hand, tele-work and homework are also progressing and have a clear impact on the reduction of mobility. They will continue to spread in the world of work, whereas tele-working will be more and more substituted by home-working: employees are turning into contractors and salaried people becoming self-employed. Increasingly, consumption and entertainment-oriented lifestyles are important factors driving the growth on non-work-related mobility. This trend spreads more and more also towards lower income households, implying a change in lifestyles as well. Cultural forces of change are at work which influence the development of leisure-oriented mobility. A significant impact on mobility is resulting from changes in the pattern of work, with travels during a larger number of longer week-ends and more numerous, but shorter holiday periods. The decreasing price of air fares encourages long-distance leisure mobility.

Finally, lifestyles are also affected by trends towards gender equality. Over the past decade, the employment rate of women has regularly increased. Despite the slowdown in economic growth during the last few years and the limited employment growth, a positive trend towards closing gender gaps could be observed in education and employment in the enlarged EU-25, while the pay gap between women and men remains almost unchanged.

Social cohesion and integration have become major sources of concern in the evolution of European society. A number of factors are at the origin of current problems, such as high unemployment levels, deficits in the integration of marginal or ethnic groups etc.

Access to employment is of key significance for social inclusion, since it determines in most cases whether people are able both to enjoy a decent standard of living and contribute fully to the society in which they live. Unemployment became a significant problem in the EU during the 1970s (impacts of oil shocks) and high unemployment rates remained up to now in most countries, with a few exceptions. Unemployment has also severely affected the countries of central and eastern Europe after the breakdown of former regimes. The situation has improved in between in a number of them thanks to courageous reforms which attracted significant levels of foreign investments.

Presently, all European countries are concerned, with more or less intensity, by poverty and social exclusion. Poverty is closely linked to unemployment. Only 7% of the employed population in the EU had income below the poverty line in 2000, as against 38% of the unemployed and 25% of the inactive. The risk of poverty is higher for particular household types. In the EU-15, some 35% on average of those living alone with dependent children and almost 30% of people of 65 and over living alone have income below poverty line. The risk of poverty and social exclusion is also important in the new member states. Poverty affects particularly ethnic minorities facing cumulative handicaps in terms of access to employment, to education, social services, housing and health care.

Social exclusion is a very broad concept which includes not only deprivation, but also problems of social relationships, including social isolation and failures in social protection. The impacts of social exclusion, poverty and deficits in integration are particularly visible at local level, especially in cities. Homelessness and multiple deprivation combined with growing insecurity and criminality are the most apparent manifestations of current problems. Typical problems in poor areas are inadequate play space, educational problems, problems of home maintenance, lack of community facilities, vandalism etc. It should not be overlooked, however, that inner cities and other urban deprived areas, where 'social exclusion is concentrated, equally function as 'spaces of inclusion' for those societal groups that are not accepted by mainstream society.

At a wider scale, regional identities are by essence a complex set of socio-cultural factors which play also a significant part in integration. A new development paradigm has emerged over the past decades, according to which strong regional identities favour territorial development. Identification with the region, combined with a distinct regional culture is seen as vital when striving at creating an atmosphere of trust, entrepreneurship and creativity among citizens. The discourse on culture within the new development paradigm aims at strengthening the feeling of solidarity and symbolic community among citizens. The promotion of regional identities has become a common element of numerous regional development strategies and not only in regions where clear deficit in regional identity can be observed. Nevertheless, strong regional identities may also generate drawbacks and lead to shortcomings in development and integration (provincialism and 'backward looking' cultures, social marginalisation of ethnic groups etc.).

In the countries of central and eastern Europe, a number of new tendencies are developing (in addition to immigration from outside) which strongly influence the integration process:

- Cultural and ethnic tensions between majority (ies) and minorities (Jews, gypsies, Aromanians etc.);
- Social and economic polarisation;
- Housing crisis, urban crisis;
- Strong suburbanisation, rise of gated communities;

- Isolation of the peripheral regions and sub-regions;
- Acculturation (by mass media, by demonstration effect, by circular migration);
- Growth of economic and general criminal activities.

### **9.1.2 EU policies related to socio-cultural development and integration**

The EU has not a strictly defined policy of socio-cultural development and integration, but various EU policies deliver contributions in this field. IN this respect, the EU policies concerned can be divided in:

- employment-related EU socio-cultural policies. The European Employment Strategy, supported by the Social Fund, has three interrelated objectives: working towards full employment; quality and productivity at work and social cohesion and an inclusive labour market. To achieve this, the Strategy lays down employment guidelines, valid for the whole EU. Quality is the watchword: investment in education and training; schemes to help women, the long-term unemployed and older workers return to or remain on the labour market reduce unemployment and boost productivity. Progress in labour law, health and safety and social dialogue have helped the EU to develop its social model. Faced with far-reaching changes in the economy and the labour market, new responses to improving working conditions are needed: fostering economic dynamism and innovation, ensuring social stability and accommodating the needs of those adversely affected by the changes. The Social Agenda (2000) aimed at implementing the Lisbon Strategy with the objective to return to full employment. The Agenda has been putting forward new and better forms of governance of social policy. This means involving the different actors –unions, employers, local and national authorities and NGOs – more fully in shaping and implementing the policies and creating the right mix of policy instruments. The new Social Agenda (2005) has two key priorities: employment and fighting poverty and promoting equal opportunities.

- non-employment related EU socio-cultural policies. These comprise the EU cultural policy, public health policy and policy aiming at eradicating poverty and combating discrimination. EU initiatives in the cultural sector aim at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their actions. The aim is to encourage the creation of a 'European Cultural Area'. Cultural cooperation is encouraged by means of the Culture 2000 Programme, but also by specific actions financed by other European programmes. These involve European cooperation in the broad sense, since the majority of the programmes are open to the Member States of the European Economic Area and to the applicant countries. Various other policies are also supporting cultural activities in the EU (structural policies, R&D policy, European Neighbourhood Policy etc.). On 23 September 2002, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a Decision on the programme of Community action in the field of public health (2003-2008). This programme entered into force on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2003. In 2002, the Commission proposed a new Community strategy on health and safety at work to cover the period until 2006. It builds on the knowledge that the absence of high quality occupational health and safety policy generates a significant economic cost. In the context of the Lisbon Strategy, the EU governments set the goal of making a decisive impact on eradicating poverty by 2010. Commission's plan was for Member States to coordinate their social protection policies within a single coherent framework. Under the plan, national action plans set targets for reducing the number of people significantly at risk of poverty and social exclusion with measures to help the most vulnerable as one of the priorities. Non-discrimination is considered as important to tackle poverty and deprivation and bring the marginalised into mainstream society. Ground-breaking EU legislation on combating discrimination based on race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability.

### 9.1.3 Main driving forces

Driving forces in the socio-cultural field or with significant impacts in this field are in particular:

- growing social-economic dualisation in a context of high unemployment, rising poverty and increasing concentration of wealth;
- the globalisation and European integration processes (unification of lifestyles and of cultural behaviour);
- continuation of immigration into Europe, bringing with it different socio-cultural patterns and behaviours; increasing size of population groups of non-European origin (high fertility rates of women belonging to these groups);
- technological evolution (impacts on consumption, leisure and mobility patterns; on employment/unemployment and social exclusion);
- population ageing, bringing with it different values, lifestyles, mobility patterns;
- perception of integration problems by the European population (potential political impacts)
- EU-enlargements (past and future);
- socio-cultural integration policies at various levels; multiculturalist approaches.

### 9.1.4 Towards hypotheses for prospective scenarios on socio-cultural evolution and integration

The wide diversity of aspects and dimensions in the field of socio-cultural evolution and integration makes the choice of hypotheses for prospective scenarios particularly difficult. Looking however at the aspects causing presently greatest concern and likely to increase in significance in future, the socio-cultural integration of marginal and ethnic groups, in relation with immigration, has a prominent place in the list. Taking into account the context of population ageing and the growing immigration into the EU, it seems appropriate to investigate two opposite possibilities:

- a situation where current integration problems will amplify under the effect of growing immigration and inappropriate public policies at various levels. Lack of coordination and insufficient efficiency of public policies will favour the development of a segmented European society with increasing economic imbalances between groups, growing social and cultural tensions and conflicts. Impacts on cities will be particularly severe. In terms of policies applied, the scenario hypotheses are rather close to trends, but combined with an increase of problem intensity calling for new policy responses which do not take place.
- an alternative situation where problems of socio-cultural integration have been recognised as a priority issue at highest level in the European context and where innovative integration policies are being developed and applied in a coordinated way so as to shape a peaceful multicultural society in Europe.

### 9.1.5 Sources of information

The scenario base results from a compilation of information from the following documents:

- 'Third Cohesion Report'. European Commission. 2004.
- 'The spatial effects of demographic trends and migration'. ESPON Project 1.1.4. ITPS. Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies.
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- 'The English Indices of Deprivation ». Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. London. 2004.
- 'Globalisation or regionalisation?'. NIC 2020 Europe Group Driver Paper. Budapest. 2004.
- 'Urban Audit'. European Commission. 2004.
- 'Inner-city misery. Real and imagined'. Guy Baeten. City. Vol.8. N°2.
- 'Lifestyles and the environment'. C. Harrison; G. Davies. ESRC Global Environmental change Programme. University College. London. 1998.
- 'Lifestyles, mobility and the challenge of sustainability. A survey of literature'. L. Hilty; A. Vollmer; D. Schulthess; T. Ruddy. Solothurn University of Applied Sciences. 2000.
- 'Europe: expectations and reality'. Reports of the Second European Social Science Conference. Slovak Commission for UNESCO. Bratislava. 1999.
- 'Communication of the Commission on the Social Agenda' COM(2005)33 final. European Commission. 2005.
- 'Communication to the Spring European Council: working together for growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy'. European Commission. 2005.
- 'Commission working document. Application of Art. 151(4) of the EC Treaty: use of the Structural Funds in the field of culture during the period 1994-99. European Commission.
- 'Modernising the European social model'. European Commission. 2003.
- 'Scoreboard on implementing the social policy agenda'. European Commission. 2004.
- 'Regional identity and information society'. J. Millard, A.L. Christensen. BISER. Domain Report N°4. 2001.
- 'Cultural identity and political responsibility'. N. Burgi-Golub. Cultural Policy. Vol. 0. 2000.
- 'L'impératif de la sécurité culturelle dans l'Europe morcelée'. E. Delgado (1995).
- 'Culture, identity and regional development in the European Union ». J. Süßner. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung. Heft 4/5. 2002.
- 'Regional identity and social capital in regional economic development and planning'. Gaari Raagma. University of Tartu.

## **9.2 Prospective thematic scenarios 'Socio-cultural evolution and integration'**

### **9.2.1 Scenario 1: Non-mastered socio-cultural integration**

#### **9.2.1.1 Scenario hypotheses**

The main hypothesis of the scenario is one of increasing socio-cultural tensions and disruptions in Europe. Tensions between income groups, ethnic and religious groups are increasing and public policies are not successful in promoting social inclusion and integration as well as tolerance between the various cultural communities. Numerous elements of the scenario's hypotheses are derived from the extrapolation of trends.

#### **9.2.1.2 Driving forces**

The main driving forces leading to socio-cultural tensions and disruptions in Europe are:

- the increasing dualisation of European society resulting from higher remuneration of capital than of labour as well as from larger segments of the European labour force excluded from the labour market;
- the growing (mainly uncontrolled) immigration from outside the EU;
- insufficient public policies related to education, social inclusion, multiculturalist approaches, enhancement of regional identities and heritage.

#### **9.2.1.3 Context**

The EU has difficulties in reaching a sufficient growth rate in a context of challenging globalisation and devotes most of its energy and resources in promoting and liberalising the economy while neglecting the social impacts of economic transformations as well as the socio-cultural constraints resulting from progressing immigration and exclusion. Within the EU member countries, various types of socio-cultural policies are carried out by the different administrative levels, the efficiency of which varies widely from country to country. The lack of real coordination between the various levels and the pressure put on the lower levels result in the fact that socio-cultural tensions and conflicts cannot be mastered.

#### **9.2.1.4 Scenario process**

After 2005, a number of trends observed during the decade starting in 1995 intensified, mainly in metropolitan areas. Social segregation progressed in inner-city areas and in peripheral housing estates accompanied by urban deprivation, homelessness, insecurity and criminality. Urban areas with high accessibility through public transportation (railway stations, crossings of subway lines etc.) became also subject to increasing insecurity. Degradation expanded around these areas, a factor which contributed to accelerate segregation. People sufficiently well off chose more and more locations distant from the most socially problematic areas. A large number of them working in inner cities moved to the surrounding rural areas and became long-distance commuters. Those who remained within or at proximity of these deprived areas were low income often aged people.

Numerous well-off retired people decided to move from large cities towards distant, attractive and climate-favoured rural areas or small cities. This trend accelerated after 2010 when large cohorts of baby-boomers reached retirement age.

Social differentiation of lifestyles increased and was accompanied by a qualitative differentiation of the image and endowment of areas with services and amenities. The better offs have shown higher mobility (work and leisure commuting, long-distance trips by car, train and plane) and stronger consumption patterns, not only of goods, but also more and more of all kinds of services in various fields (health, culture, leisure etc.). The number of private schools and hospitals strongly developed in such areas. Because of increasing insecurity in public transportation, a large number of people have been using their cars, even for short-distance trips and mobility of the less well off diminished.

The failure of public policies in including the socially disabled population of working age into the labour market generated a growing scarcity of manpower in a context of accelerating population ageing. The employment rate decreased strongly after 2010. Caring services for the elderly could not be sufficiently developed. In a context of growing dependency rate, the less well off among the elderly became strongly disfavoured in terms of caring services.

A strong competition developed for attracting young qualified people. In order to successfully match this constraint, numerous footloose enterprises moved towards areas and regions with a good image in terms of attractiveness and safety.

Until the mid 2010s, problems were mainly concentrated in metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, a number of regions were confronted with problems at a larger scale. Regions along the Mediterranean coast (Spain, France, Italy and to a lesser extent Greece) had to face more and more the cumulative effects of growing immigration flows from outside Europe (Africa, Middle East) and flows of European migrants looking for favourable climatic and environmental conditions. The first 'gated communities' had emerged in these regions before the year 2000. Their number significantly increased over time. In central and eastern Europe, the impact of immigration became more and more sensitive.

In the new member countries, the growing polarisation of economic activities in metropolitan areas generated strong increase in housing price, so that numerous people excluded from the labour market or with insufficient income to cope with growing costs of living in large cities moved towards distant small and medium-sized towns and rural areas. Insecurity in large cities had started increasing during the transition period. It continued growing because of larger numbers of marginalised people. The cities of central and eastern Europe were not excluded from these trends.

After 2015, xenophobia, cultural intolerance, racist attitudes, political radicalism had reached such levels that cohabitation between groups with different income levels, ethnic or religious origin became increasingly difficult. In the countries of central and eastern Europe, problems related to minorities became acute, with increasing tensions and radical attitudes. The problems of metropolitan areas propagated towards medium-sized and small towns. The number of gated communities boomed throughout Europe. Electronic control and security systems generalised and affected most segments of everyday life. Numerous re-education centres and jails were built to alleviate the feeling of insecurity. Tensions between cultural, ethnic and religious groups exacerbated in such a way that multiculturalist approaches became unrealistic and even counterproductive in the political sphere. Radicalisation of political attitudes worsened the situation. New forms of nationalism or 'comunitarism' developed.

By 2030, European society was strongly divided and segmented. The new regulation processes which had become necessary to maintain a certain level of stability has severely

endangered democracy at various levels. Europe had moved towards a system of authoritarian governance which did not exclude a number of socially chaotic situations in numerous regions and cities.

### **9.2.1.5 Impacts**

#### *Macro-economic impacts*

The failure in integrating the socially disabled groups of working age into the labour market has reduced the employment rate and has had strongly negative impacts on economic development. The shortage of qualified manpower has been a severe constraint with regard to the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. A weaker economic situation had also indirect impacts on the provision of public services (health, culture, public transportation etc.), inhibiting growth in the service sector. Furthermore, the socio-cultural fragmentation of the European society and the rigidity of the new governance systems have been acting as significant obstacles to the exploitation of the 'territorial capital' of the various European regions, the success of which largely depends upon networking, exchange of information, cooperation, flexible attitudes, public-private partnerships etc.

Neglecting the enhancement of regional identities (culture, heritage etc.) has had detrimental effects on the economy also. The deterioration of urban areas, comprising the related infrastructure and facilities, has generated significant costs with long-term impacts.

#### *Regional, territorial and environmental impacts*

Territorial impacts of socio-cultural disruptions in Europe are stronger at the meso and micro levels than at the macro level. This does not exclude that the intensity of tensions and chaotic situations in a number of regions and cities may have large-scale impacts, for instance on the intensity of transnational migration flows within the EU.

Socio-cultural tensions and disruptions are favouring the move of people out of large cities and urban regions towards more 'socially quiet' areas (small and medium-sized towns, rural areas). This has been particularly obvious for retired people which are no more bound to their workplace. Other segments of the population have however also been concerned. An increasing number of active people have chosen to commute over long distances or to turn towards home-working. Pressure on attractive areas has been increasing because new forms of Greenfield settlements with more secure character could be developed. The suburbanisation trends also exploded in central and eastern Europe.

There have been significant negative environmental impacts from growing motor-car traffic, resulting from both substitution to increasingly insecure public transportation and stronger commuter flows. In cities, dereliction and multiple deprivation have significantly expanded.

### **9.2.1.6 Final image**

By 2030, a number of components of the European territory have substantially changed. The territory is much more segmented and divided according to socio-cultural characteristics. Attractive rural areas have been invaded by various groups of people, in particular by retired ones and by an increasing number of home workers. Rural areas surrounding large cities have been affected by large flows of newcomers commuting to their workplace. All these groups have in common the search of a more secure and more friendly socio-cultural environment. A large number of gated communities have been developed and are scattered throughout the most valuable and attractive landscapes in tourist areas or at proximity of large and medium-sized cities.

The counterpart is the presence of large urban areas with multiple deprivation which have expanded because of the deterioration of the economic situation and of the departure of the most well offs, but also of medium-level income groups. Social segregation in urban areas is extremely accentuated and is reflected in very different townscapes, some being slums, other being well protected high-standing estates. Areas in between are unstable.

The environment has deteriorated, both in urban areas where dereliction has progressed and in attractive rural areas where settlements and transport infrastructure have strongly developed. Suburbanisation has significantly expanded at the expense of valuable natural areas near cities. Air pollution has increased as a result from more intensive use of motor-cars.

At a wider level, a number of regions with insufficient economic development resulting from low attractiveness, neglected territorial potential and regional identities (often offset by general socio-cultural tensions), are laying behind. Numerous of them could not catch up; so that the European situation in 2030 is one of increased regional disparities, when compared with that prevailing in 2005.

#### **9.2.1.7      *Main issues arising from the scenario***

The scenario highlights the fact that Europe has come into a stage of its history where socio-cultural factors are gaining increasing importance and may have a leading and strategic role in future. Neglecting this dimension in the context of European integration is likely to generate significant socio-cultural disruptions which may be seriously detrimental to economic development. The potential territorial impacts of socio-cultural tensions and disruptions are numerous. Not only urban areas are affected, but also the surroundings of cities, attractive rural areas and, as a counterpart, less attractive regions.

### **9.2.2      **Scenario 2: Towards a sustainable multicultural and socially cohesive Europe****

#### **9.2.2.1      *Scenario hypotheses***

The scenario is a policy scenario. It assumes that new public policies are defined and implemented at the various levels which aim at integrating as many people as possible into the labour market through education policies, at facilitating social cohesion through dialogue and tolerance between the various ethnic and religious communities, at promoting regional identities as factors of integration and development. It also assumes that the EU immigration policy will be better targeted and orientated towards attracting people with a sufficient level of qualification.

#### **9.2.2.2      *Driving forces***

The main driving forces leading to the adoption of public policies as described above are:

- the increasing social tensions, troubles and criminality in a large number of European metropolitan areas related to the growing importance of marginal groups excluded from the labour market and from the mainstream society;
- the growing poverty and exclusion in the European society;

- the ageing of European society and the need to replace retiring people by a sufficient number of qualified people;
- the recognition of socio-cultural factors as essential for economic development and for the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy.

### **9.2.2.3 Context**

The context which has made the emergence of new public policies in the field of socio-cultural integration possible after 2005 has been the growing awareness that the achievement of the Lisbon-Göteborg Strategy was not possible in a climate of growing social tensions and disruptions and of cultural intolerance. The challenge generated by population ageing and the related scarcity of qualified manpower was an additional argument to promote the integration of people excluded from the labour market and, more generally from the mainstream society. It was also recognised that the growing cultural heterogeneity in Europe resulting from immigration but also from the successive EU enlargements called for a positive multiculturalist approach.

### **9.2.2.4 Scenario process**

Substantial changes in public policies in the years following 2005 resulted from the convergence of two main factors: the awareness that the increasing number of people excluded from the labour market was economically counterproductive and the growing exasperation of urban dwellers about increasing insecurity and criminality in cities. The resulting climate of xenophobia and political radicalisation in numerous European cities was considered as serious enough by the various national governments to envisage the strengthening of coordination of policies at EU level, together with the involvement of a higher amount of EU resources in activities the most likely to contribute to the solution of problems.

In the context of the open method of coordination, member states decided to give an absolute priority to education and training of those groups already marginalised or threatened to become marginalised, with a specific attention to young people (early school leavers with or without diplomas). An efficient system was set up which benefited from significant EU support and combined fellowships (conditioned to assiduity and success in learning), actions of awareness rising and civic education, repression of criminality always combined with education and/or vocational training measures, coaching of socially disabled people, in particular when entering into the labour market. Not only social workers and educators and teachers, but more and more retired people with a successful career in enterprises were involved in training and coaching actions of young and/or marginal people.

A great attention was paid to the maintenance of urban areas affected or threatened by multiple deprivation, addressing not only the physical aspect of the urban fabric, but also the endowment with services and facilities favouring social inclusion. Efforts were developed to support specific ethnic and religious cultures in a climate of tolerance.

A particular consideration was given to the promotion of regional identities in less prosperous regions in order to both promote the indigenous potential and regional capital of these areas and to counteract trends of xenophobia and racist/nationalist attitudes.

The governance of the strategy actively involved all levels from the municipal to the European ones. At EU level, in addition to the mobilisation of significant resources from the EU budget, transnational actions in the field of socio-cultural integration and promotion were developed and supported. The various EU policies in the field of culture, education and training, regional and local development etc. were more integrated and better targeted in

order to better correspond to the strategies developed at regional and local level. Networking of local experiences was developed. It contributed to strengthening the multiculturalist approach. The EU immigration policy changed substantially. While illegal immigration was more severely controlled, the (temporary or definitive) immigration of qualified people was favoured.

By 2015, the first significant results of the strategy could be observed. Criminality and insecurity in cities had generally decreased, a fact which contributed to weaken attitudes of xenophobia and racism/nationalism. Social stability could be improved in numerous European cities.

The promotion of regional identities in relation with the mobilisation of territorial potentials made the development of economic activities possible, also in disfavoured regions. The availability of qualified and motivated manpower enabled innovation and networking activities in line with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy.

It was however after 2015 that the strategy proved to be the most useful. After the retirement of large numbers of people from the labour market, demand of qualified people increased significantly. Education, training and social inclusion activities which had been developed during the period 2005-2015 proved to be extremely fruitful. Not only enterprises benefited from them, but also the whole caring sector for the elderly.

In such a context, the reluctance of numerous Europeans with regard to further EU enlargements had been alleviated and negotiations with a number of new candidate countries could start, so that by 2030 the EU borders coincided more or less with those of the 'wider Europe'. This had only been possible because the Europeans and their governments and institutions had learned that continuous and intense activities of socio-cultural integration accompanied by a multiculturalist approach was an essential and strategic activity to ensure European development, integration and expansion.

#### **9.2.2.5 Impacts**

##### **Macro-economic impacts**

The strategy is based on the involvement of larger amounts of resources in the sectors of education, training, social inclusion, culture etc. As far as resources from the EU budget are concerned, savings in other sectors had to be made and more integrated and targeted approaches had to be developed. In the various member states, similar re-organisation of resource allocation had also to be carried out. Main constraints existed in the first years of implementation of the strategy. From 2010 onwards, return on investments was already significant in terms of savings of public resources for the unemployed and the socially disabled, the number of which had seriously diminished. The increase of the employment rate generated not only higher tax revenue for public budgets, but also stronger purchase power and more economic activities. The strategy contributed significantly to alleviate the shortage of qualified manpower which resulted from the emergence of large number of retiring people.

##### **Regional, territorial and environmental impacts**

At macro-level, the strategy contributed to reduce the volume of transnational and interregional migration flows which are often generated by economic as well as social factors. The fact that the strategy was strongly coordinated and promoted at EU level ensured high efficiency in the various European countries and regions, so that the potential increase of regional disparities was alleviated. This favoured slower concentration of people and activities in the Pentagon.

At meso-scale, within the various member countries, less people, in particular the retired ones, were inclined to leave the cities and to settle in distant rural areas. The spatial segregation of generations was alleviated.

Most positive impacts were to be observed at the regional/local level, especially in and around metropolitan areas as well as in less important cities. The expansion of deprived areas could be limited and the rehabilitation of a number of these areas was successful. The development of gated communities was contained and concerned only a limited number of sites attracting 'international clients' (tourist, retired people) in high-standing, highly attractive areas.

A relatively peaceful urban climate enabled to maintain compact cities serviced by public transportation and less dependent upon motor-cars. Pressure on surrounding open spaces and rural areas was limited as the progress of suburbanisation could be contained.

#### **9.2.2.6 Final image**

Through the implementation of the strategy, the European territory will have maintained by 2030 numerous characteristics it had in 2005. A number of changes will however have been caused by the structural evolution of the economy and of demography (provided no other perturbing events will have happened in between). Attractive rural areas are more densely populated than they were in 2005, especially in regions of southern Europe, due to population moves of retired people and of people in situation of working far away from cities. Cities are more lively with a clear cosmopolitan touch reflecting the success of integration policies. Social and cultural segregation has not completely disappeared, but is less visible. People with non-European origin have to a significant extent reached middle-class and even upper-class level, so that the areas where they are living have the character of specific cultural communities and do not, for the largest part, reflect poverty and deprivation.

A number of disfavoured regions have benefited from the promotion of cultural identities and developed their territorial potential in such a way that their competitiveness and resistance capacity in the context of globalisation have increased. They are no more marginalised territories.

#### **9.2.2.7 Main issues arising from the scenario**

The scenario highlights not only the benefits which may result from renewed and sustained socio-cultural policies in terms of economic development and social cohesion, but also the need to involve more the European level in such policies, both as a level of coordination between the various EU countries and as a provider of financial resources. With such an approach, undesired spatial evolutions are likely to be avoided and restrained.

### **9.2.3 ESPON core indicators related to the scenarios**

- Households
- Household-oriented infrastructure
- Population growth
- Natural population growth
- Net migration rate
- Ageing/ Dependencies
- Reproduction potential
- Population in 'functional', 'strategic' age
- Total fertility rate
- Proportion of households with Internet access
- Proportion of households with broadband Internet access
- Population density
- Population by age
- Labour force
- Activity rates
- Unemployment rates
- Total employment
- Employment by qualification and profession
- Human capital
- Purchasing power indices